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NOTE
MISSOURI'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH ACT:
THE PROBLEMS WITH PROGRESS
The Missouri legislature, after an aborted attempt in 1977,' suc-
ceeded in passing a comprehensive new act to govern civil commitment
of the mentally ill. 2 The act, which repeals twenty-nine sections and
enacts forty-seven new sections, represents Missouri's first major piece
of legislation in the mental health area since 1953. 3 The definitions and
the procedures became effective July 1, 1978, and January 2, 1979,
respectively.'
The revision of the mental health code was prompted in part by
court decisions in other states that declared unconstitutional under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment5 provisions similar to
those in the old Missouri code.6 Potential sources of constitutional in-
firmity included the vagueness and breadth of the definition of those
persons subject to involuntary commitment,7 the delay before a judicial
1. Mo. S. 275, 79th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1977).
2. Mentally Deficient and Mentally Ill Persons-Treatment and Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment (Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 202.010- .225).
Civil commitment should be distinguished from criminal commitment. Criminal commitment
refers to:
those proceedings under which a person. who has been charged with a criminal offense
and who asserts he is not liable to criminal punishment because, at the time of the of-
fense, he suffered from a mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, and who.
after being acquitted upon that ground, is committed to the division of mental diseases.
State v. Kee. 510 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Mo. 1974). Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 552.010- .080 (1979) governs
criminal commitment proceedings in Missouri.
3. The last major piece of legislation was entitled: Relating to Hospitalization of the Men-
tally Il1, ch, 202, 1953 Mo. Laws 647.
4. Mentally Deficient and Mentally III Persons-Treatment and Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment, ch. 202, 1978 Mo. Legis. Serv. 83, 103 (Vernon).
5, US. CONST. amend. XIV (-nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property. without due process of law"),
6, Eg., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa.),
prob. juris. noted. 437 U.S. 902 (1978) (No. 77-1715); J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga.
1976).prob.juris noted, 431 U.S. 936 (1977) (No. 76-1690); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
SED, Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); In re Roger S., 19
Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
503 (1975).
7. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.010(12) (1969) and Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.807.5 (Supp.
1975) with Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1095-96 (E.D. Mich. 1974) and
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hearing,8 the content of the notice of hearing received by a person al-
leged to be mentally ill,9 the standard of proof required at the hear-
ing,'0 and the power of a court to order hospitalization for an
indeterminate period."
The strong movement to protect the civil rights of the mentally ill
also spurred the modernization of commitment standards and proce-
dures.12 Civil libertarians, analogizing the loss of liberty in civil com-
mitment to that in criminal confinement, advocated that the procedural
protections afforded to criminal offenders be provided to those subject
Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 971 (M.D. Pa. 1971) and Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa.
Super. Ct. 155, 183, 339 A.2d 764, 778 (1975) (three judges) andHawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109,
123 (W. Va. 1974). But see In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 485 (Fla. 1977); Fhagen v. Miller, 29
N.Y.2d 348, 354, 278 N.E.2d 615, 617, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396-97, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
8. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.805 (1969) (full hearing within 25 days) with Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (full hearing within 7 days) and Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091-92 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (preliminary hearing within 48 hours and
full hearing within 10 to 14 days). But see Logan v. Arafeh, 349 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (D. Conn.
1972) (full hearing within 45 days "not so baseless as to be unconstitutional"), af9dnem. sub nora,
Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
9. The previous code provided that: "Upon receipt of an application [for involuntary hospi-
talization] the court shall give notice thereof, and of the time of hearing thereon, to the proposed
patient, and to his legal guardian." Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.807.2 (Supp. 1975). Cf. Lynch v,
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974) ("Such notice should include the date, time, and
place of the hearing; a clear statement of the purpose of the proceedings and the possible conse-
quences to the subject thereof; the alleged factual basis for the proposed commitment; and a state-
ment of the legal standard upon which commitment is authorized.") (footnote omitted); Lessard v,
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972) ("The patient should be informed of the basis
for his detention, his right to jury trial, the standard upon which he may be detained, the names of
the examining physicians and all other persons who may testify in favor of his continued deten.
tion, and the substance of their proposed testimony.") (footnote omitted).
10. The Missouri statute was silent on the degree of proof required, Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 202.807.2 (Supp. 1975); thus courts applied the preponderance of evidence test used in civil
cases. But see In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reasonable doubt standard); Les-
sard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (same). Many courts have adopted the
intermediate standard of clear and convincing proof. See, e.g., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec-
retary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 44 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris noted, 437 U.S, 902 (1978) (No.
77-1715); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 393 (M.D. Ala. 1974), Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325
F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971); In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 488 (Fla. 1977); In re Stephen-
son, 67 111. 2d 544, 556, 367 N.E.2d 1273, 1278 (1977); State v. Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 343, 540 P.2d
818, 822 (1975); In re Levias, 83 Wash. 2d 253, 256, 517 P.2d 588, 590 (1973); Hawks v. Lazaro,
202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (W. Va. 1974).
11. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.807.5 (Supp. 1975) with Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F.
Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (6 months maximum commitment).
12. See B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS (1973); T. SZASz, LAW,
LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC SLAVERY (1977); I LEGAL RIGHTS Of
THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973).
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to civil commitment laws. 13
This Note summarizes key provisions of Missouri's revised mental
health code, compares them with the repealed provisions, and discusses
the difficulties the new code presents for the mentally ill, the medical
and legal professions, and the judiciary.
1. STANDARDS FOR COMMITMENT
Any person who has "symptoms of mental disorder, mental illness,
alcoholism, or drug abuse"' 4 may apply for admission as a voluntary
patient to a public mental health facility.' 5 The code defines "mental
disorder," a term not used in the previous statute, as "any organic,
mental or emotional impairment, including those induced by alcohol-
ism or drug abuse, which has substantial adverse effects on a person's
cognitive, volitional, or emotional functioning."' 6 The definition of
13. T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 182-90 (1963); Ennis, Civil Liberties and
lentallllness. 20 CRIM L. BULL. 101, 108 (1971). The drive to formalize the commitment process
,.ontrasts with the patient-rights movement of an earlier era, which advocated the informalization
of commitment proceedings using the juvenile court as a model. See general, N. KITTRIE, THE
RfCHT To BE DIFFERENT 79-83 (1971).
14. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202,155 (1979). The code contains no definition of "alcoholism" or
-drug abuse." The prior code also failed to define these terms. Compare Missouri's failure to
define these terms with Wisconsin's efforts. "'Alcoholic' means a person who habitually lacks
Nelf-control as to the use of alcoholic beverages and uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that his
or her health is substantially impaired or by reason of such use is deprived of his or her ability to
'upport or care for himself or herself, or such person's family." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.01(1) (West
Supp. 1978-1979). "'Drug dependent' means a person who uses one or more drugs to the extent
that the person's health is substantially impaired or his or her social functioning is substantially
disrupted." Id. § 51.08(8).
In addition to its failure to define these terms, the Missouri code lacks a declaration of legisla-
uve purpose. Compare other states' articulation of legislative intent. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. &
I NST. CODE § 5001 (Deering Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1978-
t'79); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71,05.010 (1975)- Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.001 (West Supp. 1978-
1979). A declaration of the policies intended to be pursued may be essential to proper judicial
interpretation of statutory language.
The [state] legislatures provide administrators and courts nothing but the statutes them-
selves. Without legislative assistance in interpretation, courts have resorted to all the
artificialities which make the rules of statutory construction an impenetrable tangle of
waste words. . . .Legislatures must accept the responsibility of providing something
more than journals recording motions made and lost, amendments offered, and final roll
call votes and committee reports that consist of solemn recommendations that "the bill
do (or do not) pass."
Horack, Jr., Cooperative Action for Improved Statutori, Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 382, 387
1950),
15 Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.010 (16) (1979). The head of a private mental health facility may
also accept voluntary and involuntary patients under the act. Id
16 Id. § 202.010(3).
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"mental illness"' 7 is narrower in scope than "mental disorder;" it spe-
cifically excludes mental retardation, developmental disabilities, narco-
lepsy, simple intoxication, drug or alcohol dependence or addiction,
and "any other disorders not of an actively psychotic nature, such as
senility, unless such conditions are accompanied by a mental illness." "'
The state may involuntarily commit for treatment19 a mentally ill
person who, as a result of his mental illness, presents a likelihood of
serious physical harm to himself or others.20 Likelihood of serious
physical harm to oneself, under the code, requires a showing of a "sub-
stantial risk" that physical harm will be self-inflicted as evidenced by
"recent threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm
on himself, or by failure or inability to provide for his essential human
needs."'" Likelihood of serious physical harm to others, on the other
17. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.010(4) (1979) defines "mental illness" as:
[A] state of impaired mental processes, which impairment results in a distortion of a
person's capacity to recognize reality due to hallucinations or delusions or faulty percep-
tions or alterations of mood and interferes with an individual's ability to reason, under-
stand or exercise conscious control over his actions, and may be manifested by instances
of grossly impaired behavior.
This definition covers only schizophrenics, manic-depressives, paranoids, and psychotic.depres-
sives. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS §§ 295-98 (2d ed. 1968).
18. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.010(4)(a)-(d) (1979). Sections 202.187- .195 cover persons with
mental retardation and developmental disabilities. Although these provisions are not discussed in
this Note, the mentally retarded and developmentally disabled receive greater protection in some
instances than the mentally ill. For example, a mentally retarded minor with voluntary status who
requests discharge must be released unless dangerous; however, a mentally ill minor who requests
discharge may be held for ninety-six hours while involuntary commitment proceedings are initi-
ated on the mere ground that the head of the facility does not concur in his release. Id.
§§ 202.187.2(3), .115.2(3), respectively.
19. A recent federal district court decision draws into question the right of a state to forcibly
administer drugs to an involuntary mental patient. The court held that a mental patient's right of
privacy entails a right to refuse treatment in nonemergency circumstances. The right, however, is
not absolute. In a due process hearing the fact-finder must weigh the protection of hospital stair
and other patients from harm along with the extent to which the refusal of treatment is based on
the underlying mental illness against the patient's right to refuse treatment. During such a hear-
ing, the patient is entitled to counsel and an outside psychiatrist of his choice. Rennie v. Klein,
462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
20. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 202.135.5, .137.1, .143.3, .145.1 (1979). This standard comports with
the view of the Supreme Court that a "finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's
locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confine-
ment." There is "no constitutional basis for confining such persons if they are dangerous to no
one and can live safely in freedom." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
See note 44 infra for an analysis of the difficulties of predicting dangerousness.
21. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.00(5)(a) (1979). Compare Missouri's criteria with California's
treatment of suicidal persons (patient may be held for a maximum of 14 days beyond the initial
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/23
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hand, must be evidenced by "recent overt acts" that placed another in
"reasonable fear of sustaining such harm." 2
The present code makes three significant changes in civil commit-
ment standards. First, the definition of mental illness covers a much
smaller group of mental conditions.23 Under prior Missouri law,
'mental illness" meant "a state of impaired mental function [including]
alcoholism or other drug abuse to such extent that a person so afflicted
requires care and treatment for his own welfare, or the welfare of
others." 24 The old code's definition of mental illness is comparable to
the new code's definition of mental disorder.25 Thus, while the group
of persons eligible for voluntary treatment remains essentially the
same, the revision eliminates some classes of persons eligible for invol-
untary commitment. No longer will the senile, alcoholic, drug ad-
dicted, or non-psychotic individual be subject to involuntary detention
and treatment for their conditions.26
The reason for the deletion of alcoholics from the new definition of
the mentally ill may be mere legislative oversight. Section 202.177,
however, seems to indicate a conscious exclusion.28 Whatever the rea-
son, persons previously within the ambit of the civil commitment stat-
ute can now be cared for in mental hospitals only if they seek treatment
voluntarily,29 or if a court declares them incompetent and subsequently
72-hour detention period unless he is recommended for a conservatorship or is dangerous to
others. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5264 (Deering Supp. 1978)).
22. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.010(5)(b) (1979). Pennsylvania law, unlike Missouri law, does not
,onsider threats sufficient to justify commitment. A "clear and present danger to others" is shown
by "establishing that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious
bodily harm on another and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be re-
peated." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301(b) (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.010(4) (1979).
24. Id. § 202.010(12) (1969).
25. Id. § 202.010(3) (1979).
26. Id. § 202.010(4). See text accompanying note 16 supra.
27. Missouri modeled its statute after Washington's mental health code, WASH. REV. CODE
\NN. § 71.05.011- .930 (Supp. 1970), which provides for involuntary commitment of alcoholics
through another enactment, The Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, WASH.
REV, CODE ANN. § 70.96A.01 1- .930 (1975). Although Missouri adopted the majority of Wash-
mgton's provisions, it did not enact Washington's accompanying alcoholism treatment act.
28. M o. REV. STAT. § 202.177 (1979) states that:
Persons who are mentally retarded, developmentally disabled, senile or impaired by al-
coholism or drug abuse, shall not be committed judicially pursuant to the provisions of
sections 202.121 through 202.147, unless they are also mentally ill and as a result present
likelihood of serious physical harm to themselves or to others.
29. Id. § 202.115.1(1). See notes 50-51 infra and accompanying text.
Number 11
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approves the guardian's application for his ward's commitment. 30
These two routes hardly seem adequate in view of the physical danger
the alcoholic often poses to himself or others.3 Immediate danger may
be avoided by emergency detention of the individual,32 but after
ninety-six hours the hospital must release the individual regardless of
his dangerousness unless he falls within the act's narrow definition of
mental illness.33
The second major revision in the new code relates to its creation of a
"mentally disordered" category of persons.34 The legislature recog-
nized that differential diagnosis35 cannot be made instantaneously.36 A
person may act in a bizarre manner for any number of reasons, only
some of which are grounds for commitment. The state, therefore, may
detain a mentally disordered individual who presents a likelihood of
serious physical harm for a ninety-six hour period while hospital staff
observes and examines him to determine whether involuntary commit-
ment is appropriate.37 The mental health facility must release the pa-
tient if he is mentally disordered, but not mentally ill.38
The third substantial change in the newly adopted standards is the
requirement for involuntary commitment when there is a likelihood of
30. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.115.1(4) (1979). See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
31. "One half of all homicides and one third of all suicides are alcohol related, resulting in
11,700 deaths a year. Two-thirds of all assaults and felonies are committed by persons under the
influence of alcohol." J. KINNEY & G. LEATON, LOOSENING THE GRIP 24 (1978).
32. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 202.123.3 (1979). See text accompanying notes 87-88 infra.
33. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.127.1- .2 (1979). See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
34. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.010(3) (1979). "Mental disorder" is defined in text accompanying
note 16 supra.
35. "Diagnosis," in its traditional sense, implies that:
there is some concrete thing, like an organ defect, an invading germ, or some definite
psychic entity within the person, that exists internally and is the source of his behavioral
troubles. The diagnostic search is to find the pathology so it can be treated. "Differential
diagnosis" is the search for the exact disease responsible for the symptoms.
W. MISCHrEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 194 (1968).
36. The patient is committed for treatment and care, and some knowledge of his mental
condition can be gained by visual observation and diagnostic tests. This takes time ...
[W]here a full blown court trial must be had. . . , additional time to undertake more
elaborate testing of the patient's mental condition, and a more detailed probe into his
relevant history, by both the hospital authorities and the expert witnesses who will testify
in behalf of the patient is needed.
Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. Conn. 1972) (footnotes omitted), aj'd men. sub
nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
37. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.123.2- .3 (1979).
38. Id. § 202.127.1- .2. "Mental disorder" and "mental illness" are defined in notes 16 and
17 supra and accompanying text.
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serious physical harm to self or others. The old code demanded such a
showing only for emergency detention.39 For a court to order indeter-
minate involuntary hospitalization, the petitioning party needed only
to establish that the respondent was "mentally ill and in need of cus-
tody, care, or treatment in a mental facility, and because of his mental
condition lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible deci-
sions with respect to his hospitalization."4 The new code limits invol-
untary commitment to actively psychotic persons whose psychosis
renders them dangerous to themselves or others.4'
This "dangerousness" standard in the new code probably will cause
administrative problems. Many legislatures have recently narrowed
the coverage of their civil commitment statutes to persons who have
displayed overt dangerous behavior,42 but have failed to take cogni-
zance of the problems in predicting future dangerous behavior.43 In
addition, the Missouri Act offers no guidance to either the courts or
expert witnesses charged with assessing dangerousness; that is, what
magnitude, probability, or imminence of harms constitutes dangerous-
ness and justifies deprivation of a person's liberty.'
39. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 202.800.1(1), .803.1(1) (1969).
40. Id. § 202.807 (Supp. 1975).
41. Id. §§ 202.135.5, .137.1, .143.3, .145.1 (1979).
42. See 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 562 (1977) (listing Alabama, California, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, Washington, and Wisconsin). For the view that the concept of dangerousness unneces-
sarily limits a psychiatrist who desires to help his patient, see Schwed, Protecting the Rights of the
Mentall' Ill, 64 A.B.A.J. 564 (1978).
43. See Levine, The Concept of Dangerousness: Criticism & Compromise, in PSYCHOLOGY IN
THE LEGAL PROCESS 147 (B. Sales ed. 1977); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerous-
ness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974); Dix, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill and the Needfor
Data on the Prediction of Dangerousness, 19 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 318 (1976); Ennis &
Latwick, Psrchiatri, and the Presumption of Expertise: Fping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF.
L REV. 693 (1974); Monahan, Strategies for an Empirical,4nalysis of the Reduction of Violence in
Emergency Civil Commitment, 1 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 363 (1977).
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.010(5) (1979); see A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 680-82 (1974).
Definitions of what is "dangerous" tend to be as diverse as the views of individual
judges, courts, and jurisdictions. It may be that persons committed on the basis that they
are "dangerous" need not be, and would not be, if the term were more carefully defined
and its component elements identified, even if those elements could not be evaluated
with a high degree of accuracy or quantification. A more rigorous analysis, if not too
cumbersome, might well result in more sophisticated judicial decision-making.
Id. at 680.
The failure of the legislature to grapple with the term "likelihood of serious physical harm"
exemplifies the manner in which the new code fails to lend substance to its procedural protections.
"Indeed, it may not be totally inaccurate to observe that the recent surge of interest in civil coin-
Number 11
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The focus on dangerousness in the civil commitment statute also rep-
resents a departure from the state's reliance on its parenspatriae role
toward reliance on its police power as justification for commitment of
the mentally ill.45 Although likelihood of serious physical harm in-
cludes a person's "failure or inability to provide for his essential human
needs,"46 Missouri does not permit commitment of persons who other
states label "gravely disabled," unless the individual is also mentally
ill.4 Perhaps the Missouri approach is preferable because placements
in institutions such as nursing homes are generally more appropriate
for those who are not mentally ill, but require some sort of custodial
care. Under such a narrow definition of niental illness, 48 however,
surely there are persons presently housed in mental institutions who,
although not mentally ill according to the statutory definition, are too
intractable for nursing homes to manage.
II. PROCEDURES FOR VOLUNTARY ADMISSION AND DISCHARGE
The procedures for voluntary admission49 to a mental health facility
depend upon whether the applicant is an adult, a minor, or an incom-
mitment may occasionally focus on procedure to the ultimate detriment of substance." In re Bal-
lay, 482 F.2d 648, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (footnotes omitted).
Commentators, as well as judges, have noted the exaltation of procedure in the field of civil
commitment. One group attributes this phenomenon to the reluctance of the judiciary and the
mental health professionals to "scrutinize the medical-legal model of mental illness that forms the
basis of their current relationship." Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and
Psychiatric Testimony. The Falbility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U.L. REv.
11, 12 (1977).
45. For a discussion of commitment under both powers, see generally Developments in the
Law-Civil Commitment, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1207, 1245 (1974).
46. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.010(5)(a) (1979).
47. "'[G]ravely disabled' means:. . . a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental
disorder, is unable to provide for his basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1) (Deering Supp. 1978). For a study of California's experience
with the gravely disabled provision, see Warren, Involuntary Commitmentfor Mental Disorder: The
Application of California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 1 I LAW & Soc'Y REV. 629 (1977).
48. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
49. One may question whether "voluntary" patients are really voluntary. The distinction
"between willing and unwilling patients cuts across the legal one of voluntary and committed,
since some persons who are glad to come to the mental hospital may be legally committed, and of
those who come only because of strong family pressure, some may sign themselves in as voluntary
patients." Goffman, The Moral Career of the Mental Patient, in THE MAKING OF A MENTAL
PATIENT 156 n.10 (R. Price & B. Denner eds. 1973). See Gilboy & Schmidt, "Voluntary "Hospital.
ization of the Mentally Iii, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 429 (1971), for a study of voluntary admission
procedures in Illinois. The authors found that individuals are "induced to voluntarily commit
themselves with the threat of involuntary commitment as the principal means of persuasion, and
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petent. When a person sixteen years of age or older applies for admis-
sion and meets the statutory standard outlined above,50 the head of a
public mental health facility must admit the applicant if he finds that
admission is appropriate. 5 A public hospital must also accept a person
under the age of eighteen upon his parent's application if the head of
the facility believes that admission is appropriate. While such a minor
is denominated a voluntary patient under the new code, the minor need
not meet the statutory standard requried for adult voluntary admission,
i.e., symptoms of mental disorder, mental illness, alcoholism, or drug
abuse. 2 A third type of voluntary patient is the incompetent. Upon a
court order, the public mental health facility must accept a judicially
declared incompetent who meets the adult statutory standard and who,
in the opinion of the head of the facility, is appropriate for admission.53
The discharge procedure for voluntary patients is straightforward.
Adult voluntary patients may obtain their release by oral or written
request. 54 Upon such request the hospital must immediately release the
patient unless the head of the facility determines that the patient
presents a likelihood of serious physical harm,55 in which case the hos-
pital may detain the patient for not longer than four days while it initi-
ates involuntary commitment proceedings.56 Release of a minor
admitted on the application of his parent 57 is contingent upon the con-
sent of the parent.5 Similarly, release of a minor aged sixteen to eight-
een admitted on his own application is contingent upon the minor's
w%'ith little concern for the adequacy of the information on which the individual's decision is based
or whether it is 'voluntary' at all." Id. at 430.
50. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
51. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.115.1(1) (1979). Admission depends on the availability of suitable
accommodations. Id. § 202.115. 1.
52. Id § 202.115.1(2). Minors under the juvenile court's jurisdiction may be committed pur-
suant to § 211.201 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. Id. § 202.115.1(3).
53. Id. § 202.115.1(4). Thus, while incompetents are designated as "voluntary" patients,
their entrance into the mental health system is not a voluntary act.
54. "A voluntary patient who is not a minor and who requests his release either orally or in
w nting to the head of the facility or his designee, shall be released forthwith." Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 202.115.3 (1979). This provision appears to include incompetent adults. See text accompanying
notes 75-76 infra.
55. Thus, it is more difficult for a voluntary patient to obtain release than an involuntary
patient. See notes 77-80 infra and accompanying text.
56. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.115.3 (1979).
57 A minor admitted upon application of the juvenile court needs the court's consent to be
released, Id. § 202.115.2(2).
5S. Id.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
218 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:209
concurrence in the request for release.5 9 If the head of the facility does
not concur in the minor's release and decides to initiate involuntary
commitment proceedings, the child may be detained for an additional
four days.
60
These procedures for voluntary admission and discharge remain sub-
stantially unchanged from the prior statutory provisions, yet two im-
portant differences emerge. First, the new code reduces from twelve
days61 to four days 62 the time allowed for commencement of involun-
tary commitment proceedings once a voluntary patient requests release.
Second, the hospital director may no longer discharge a voluntary pa-
tient on the ground that the discharge would "contribute to the most
effective use of the hospital in the care and treatment of the mentally
ill.''63 The hospital may only discharge voluntary patients when "con-
tinued care or treatment is no longer appropriate, '64 not for reasons of
administrative efficiency.
65
The primary difficulty with the new code's voluntary procedures is its
treatment of minors. A minor need not be mentally disordered, men-
tally ill, an alcoholic, or a drug abuser to be admitted to a hospital by
his parent or guardian. The head of the mental health facility need
only believe that the child's admission is "appropriate." 66 In light of
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public We/fare,67 such a proce-
59. The code allows persons over age sixteen to apply for admission as adults, yet treats
persons between the ages of sixteen and eighteen as minors for purposes of release. Id. §§
202.115.1(1), .2(3).
60. Id. § 202.115.2(3). Compare the required showing of dangerousness for the continued
confinement of an adult after release is requested, id, with the absence of any requirement (beyond
the hospital director's approval) for confinement of a minor after release is requested, Id.
§ 202.115.3.
61. Id. § 202.790 (Supp. 1975).
62. Id. §§ 202.115.2(3), .115.3 (1979).
63. Id. § 202.787 (1969).
64. Id. § 202.120(2) (1979).
65. A public hospital, however, may deny admission to a voluntary applicant if suitable ac-
commodations are not available. Id. § 202.115.1.
66. Id. § 202.115.1(2). The procedure does not recognize the frequently disparate interests of
a parent and child. See 15 DUQ. U.L. REv. 337 (1976-77).
67. 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa.),prob.juris. noted, 437 U.S. 902 (1978) (No. 77-1715).
In 1975 the district court held unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment certain provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 that governed the
commitment of children on the ground that Pennsylvania's procedures did not adequately guard
against erroneous commitment ofjuveniles who are not mentally ill. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.
Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The statute, similar to Missouri's, provided that a state mental hospi-
tal upon a parent's application could admit a person under eighteen years of age and could only
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/23
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dure is probably unconstitutional. A three-judge federal district court
in Institutionalized Juveniles found Pennsylvania's failure to provide
minors less than fourteen years of age with a postcommitment hearing
shortly after their admission denied them procedural due process under
the fourteenth amendment.6" The court reaffirmed its stance expressed
in Bartley v. Kremens69 that the child's liberty interest outweighs the
state's interest in protecting the child and maintaining the family unit.7"
The court held that although a minor is not entitled to a precommit-
ment hearing or trial by jury, he has a right to a probable cause hearing
within seventy-two hours of admission and to a postcommitment hear-
ing within two weeks of his admission. He may retain counsel, attend
all hearings, offer testimony, and cross-examine witnesses to challenge
his commitment.7 The Missouri statute falls far short of these proce-
dural protections.
The release standard for minors is also inadequate. When a minor
requests release, the hospital may commence commitment proceedings
and detain the child for ninety-six hours while processing the
paperwork solely on the ground that the head of the facility does not
concur in the release.72 Further, the release provisions permit the hos-
pital to keep a youth sixteen years or older who, over his parent's objec-
release the child with the admitting parent's consent. Compare Mental Health and Mental Retar-
dation Act of 1966, 1966 Pa. Laws 96, §§ 402, 403 (repealed except as to mental retardation by
Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976. 1976 Pa. Laws 817, § 502) with Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 202.115.1(2), .115.2(2) (1979).
After the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture enacted a new statute, which treated as adults persons fourteen years of age and over. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979). Under the 1976 act, therefore, par-
ents could no longer admit a child fourteen years of age or older. Since the ages of the five
appellees ranged between fifteen and eighteen when the complaint was filed, the Supreme Court
held the claim moot. Kremens; v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
A group of mentally ill juveniles, age thirteen or younger, instituted a new class action challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the 1976 act. Institutionahzed Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare,
459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1978), prob. juris noted, 437 U.S. 902 (1978) (No. 77-1715).
6. 459 F. Supp. at 43-44. Accord, J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 138 (M.D. Ga. 1976)
(neither parents nor psychiatrists can "statutorily be given the power to confine a child in a mental
hospital without procedural safeguards being imposed to guard against errors in judgment and/or
the arbitrariness that the best of us humans exhibit from time to time"), probjuris noted, 431 U.S.
'436 (1977) (No. 75-1690).
69. 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated as moot, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
70. 459 F. Supp. at 43.
71. Id. at 43-44.
72. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.115.2(3) (1979).
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tions, wants to stay.73 Such an interpretation may conflict with a
parent's right to control his child's upbringing."
Another significant problem with the code is its treatment of judi-
cially declared incompetents. Although specially treated in the provi-
sions for voluntary admission,75 they are not mentioned in the
provisions for release. The release procedures for adult voluntary pa-
tients, however, appear to include incompetent adults.7 6 Surely the leg-
islature did not intend a court-ordered placement of an incompetent in
a mental health facility to be defeated by the incompetent's own re-
quest for release.
A third difficulty with the discharge procedures is the hospital's
power to hold an adult voluntary patient for ninety-six hours after he
requests release if he presents a likelihood of serious physical harm,
and the staff intends to initiate commitment proceedings against him.7 7
This standard makes it more difficult for a voluntary patient than an
73. Id. § 202.115.2(1) provides that:
A voluntary patient who is a minor ... whose release is requested ... by his parent
... or person entitled to his custody, shall be released forthwith except that: [iJf the
patient was admitted on his own application and the request for release is made by a
person other than the patient, release shall be conditioned upon the agreement of the
patient thereto.
74. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Broderick, J., dissenting), racatcd
as moot, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized and afforded great weight to the rights of
parental control and custody of their children and has given due respect to the powerful
role of the familial relationship in our democratic society. This substantial interest of
parents undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
warrants protection. It is plain that the interest of family integrity and the interests of
parents in the care, custody and nurture of their children come to the court with a mo-
mentum deserving of respect.
402 F. Supp. at 1056. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Consider Pennsylvania's solution to the problem of parental right to control:
Upon the acceptance of an application for examination and treatment by a minor 14
years or over but less than 18 years of age, the director of the facility shall promptly
notify the minor's parents, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis, and shall in-
form them of the right to be heard upon the filing of an objection. Whenever such
objection is filed, a hearing shall be held within 72 hours by a judge or mental health
review officer, who shall determine whether or not the voluntary treatment is in the best
interest of the minor.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7204 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
75. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.115.1(4) (1979).
76. Id. § 202.115.3. For text of this statute see note 54 supra.
77. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.115.3 (1979). Cf. CAL. WELF. & INST. CoDE § 6005 (Deering
1969) (a "voluntary adult patient may leave the hospital or institution at any time by giving notice
of his desire to leave to any member of the hospital staff and completing normal hospitalization
departure procedures.").
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involuntary patient to obtain his release. While a voluntary patient
must be nondangerous to secure immediate release, an involuntary pa-
tient, even if dangerous, must be released if no longer mentally ill.',
This discrepancy between release for voluntary and involuntary pa-
tients could be challenged on equal protection grounds.79 Further-
more, compulsory confinement of a voluntary patient after a request
for release may discourage voluntary admissions altogether.8 0
I1. PROCEDURES FOR INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION AND DISCHARGE
The procedural protections for involuntary patients"' are considera-
bly greater than those for voluntary patients. The new code establishes
the position of a mental health coordinator, appointed by the director
of the department of mental health to serve a particular geographic
region."' The mental health coordinator must conduct an investigation
when he receives information alleging that a person, as a result of
mental disorder, presents a likelihood of serious physical harm to him-
self or others.8 3
Any adult person, including the mental health coordinator, may file
an application for evaluation and detention of a person who may be
mentally disordered and presents a likelihood of serious physical harm
78. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.183.1 (1979).
79. Cf. In re Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968) (statute,
which did not provide for periodic judicial review of retention of voluntary patients or for com-
pulsory involvement of Mental Health Information Service for voluntary patients, held constitu-
uonal by reading into the law the same protections afforded involuntary patients); Reisner,
Psrchiatric Hospitalization and the Constitution: Some Obserrations on Emerging Trends, 1973 U.
ILL. L.F. 9, 19 (equal protection argument advanced in favor of a right to'treatment for voluntary
patients).
80. See Note, Pennslrania ' New Mental Health Procedures Act: Due Process and the Right to
Treatmentfor the Mentallr Ill, 81 DICK. L. REV. 627, 635 (1977). Although the voluntary patient
.'at the time of admission" receives information concerning release procedures, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 202.215.5 (1979), it is unclear whether he receives such information before or after he signs in.
81. Involuntary patients may include patients who were initially voluntary, but were subse-
quently committed when they requested release.
82. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 202.110, .010(I 1) (1979). The coordinator must be a psychiatrist, psy-
chologist, psychiatric nurse, or psychiatric social worker with knowledge of the civil commitment
laws. Id. § 202.010(10)-(l 1). Psychiatric residents-ie., M.D.'s training to become psychia-
trsts-who often staff the hospitals at night do not fall within the definition. Their exclusion will
require additional expenditures for evening staff because the new law mandates that a mental
health professional examine the patient within three hours after arrival at the facility. Id.
§ 202.123.4().
83. Id. § 202,12 1. 1(1).
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to himself or others.84 A probate judge then must hold an ex parte
hearing in a county where the respondent may be found to determine
whether "there is probable cause . . . to believe that the respondent
may be suffering from a mental disorder and presents a likelihood of
serious physical harm to himself or others. . . ."I' On a finding of
probable cause, the court will order the respondent taken into custody
for evaluation and treatment.
86
The code also contains emergency admission procedures. If the
mental health coordinator or a peace officer has reasonable cause to
believe that a person suffering from a mental disorder presents an "im-
minent""T likelihood of serious physical harm, the person may be taken
into custody without even an ex parte hearing before a probate court. 8
The new statute guarantees certain rights to an involuntary patient.
Within three hours of the patient's arrival, a mental health profes-
sional89 must examine the patient and the hospital must supply the pa-
tient with a copy of the application for his initial detention, a notice of
his rights, and the name and address of his appointed attorney,90 as
well as assistance in contacting the attorney, if requested.9' Within a
reasonable period of time, a physician must examine the involuntary
patient.92 As soon as possible after the patient's admission, the hospital
staff or mental health coordinator must notify a responsible member of
the patient's immediate family of the enumerated rights, provided that
the patient consents to the notification.9 The involuntary patient's
84. Id.§ 202.123.1-.2.
85. Id. § 202.123.2. Only mental disorder, not mental illness, is necessary for initial deten-
tion. At this stage, the mental disorder need not be causally related to the likelihood of serious
physical harm that the individual poses to himself or others. All hearings subsequent to the prob-
able cause hearing require that the dangerousness of the individual be linked to mental illness.
86. Id.
87. The act does not define "imminent."
88. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.123.3 (1979). See note 122 infra for a proposed amendment to this
provision.
89. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.010(10) (1979).
90. While the statute does not specify whether responsibility for appointment of attorneys
rests in the hospital or the probate court, the three-hour restriction for appointment, as a practical
matter, results in appointment by the hospital because hospitals, unlike probate courts, never
close. It is questionable whether courts can and should delegate their appointment power to hos-
pital personnel.
91. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.123.4(l)-(3) (1979).
92. This examination normally should occur within 24 hours of the patient's arrival at the
facility. Id. § 202.123.5.
93. Id. § 202.130. In addition, § 202.195 indicates that the fact of admission may not be
revealed whether the patient is voluntary or involuntary. These provisions give rise to a number
[Vol. 1979:209
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rights94 include: a judicial hearing within ninety-six hours to determine
whether there is a probable cause to detain him;95 an attorney to repre-
sent him with whom he may communicate at all reasonable times, or
the right to a private attorney at his own expense;96 notice of the pur-
pose of the evaluation and notice that whatever he says may be used
against him at the court hearing;97 the right to present evidence and
cross-examine witnesses at the hearing;98 and the right to refuse medi-
cation twenty-four hours before the probable cause hearing.99
of troublesome questions. If the patient refuses to give consent, can the hospital hold him without
notice to the family? May families of voluntary patients be notified? What action should the
hospital take if the voluntary patient is a self-admitted minor?
94. The rights enumerated in the text accompanying notes 95-99 infra reveal the striking
resemblance between the civil commitment process and the criminal process. Compare a mental
patient's rights with the following state criminal defendant's rights: Klopfer v. North Carolina,
38o U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial): Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (safeguards in
the questioning of suspects); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of opposing
witnesses); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel). See note 9 supra.
95. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.130(1) (1979). Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.
1972), mandated a probable cause hearing within 48 hours. See notes 100-07 infra and accompa-
nying text.
96. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.130(2)-(3) (1979).
It is regrettable that the legislature failed to provide specialized legal services for involuntary
patients, particularly in light of empirical evidence that court-appointed attorneys in St. Louis do
not adequately represent their clients in civil commitment proceedings. See Dix, Acute Psrchiatric
Hospitalzation of the Jlentall; Ill in the Vetropolis: An Empirical Stud;, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 485,
S44. The author concludes that, "under existing practice, the patient is accorded no real opportu-
nity to present a 'case' to hospital authorities for nonhospitalization and almost no attempt is
made to protect legally defined substantive rights of those processed through the system." Id. at
573.
In fact, as recently as 1975, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch disclosed that the court-appointed attor-
ney for nearly all commitment cases in the city, Alderman Frank C. Boland, routinely failed to
-discuss his cases with medical personnel, examine medical records or spend appreciable time
%vith his clients." He succeeded in obtaining release for only one of 375 clients over a six-year
period and never appealed an order of involuntar ' hospitalization. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept.
2X, 1975, at 1, col. 5. Cf Schmidt. Illinois' Proposed Nea, Mental Health Code.- The Need for
4dr'ocacy, 66 ILL. BJ. 402 (1978) (arguing fbr the existing code, with all its deficiencies, plus
effective advocacy through a specialized legal service agency for the mentally ill, over the pro-
posed code without specialized legal services). See generall Cohen, The Function of the Attorney
and the Commitment of the Mentally li, 44 TEx. L REv. 424 (1966).
97. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.130(4) (1979). Such a warning exemplifies the adversary nature of
the entire commitment process.
98. Id. § 202.130(5).
99, Id. § 202.130(6). In the words of one court:
The right to be present at the hearing necessarily includes the right to participate
therein to the extent of the subject's ability. Due process is not accorded by a hearing in
which the individual, though physically present, has no meaningful opportunity to par-
ticipate because of incapacity caused by excessive or inappropriate medication.
Lynch v, Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
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The probable cause hearing, which must be held within ninety-six
hours of the involuntary patient's detention, tois primarily designed to
prevent groundless confinements for extended periods of time. During
the four-day evaluation period, the head of the facility or the mental
health coordinator may file a petition for a fourteen-day involuntary
detention.' 0 ' Upon such petition the probate court must hold an infor-
mal hearing to determine whether there is probable cause for further
confinement. 2 The rules of evidence applicable to civil judicial pro-
ceedings govern the hearing, 0 3 except affidavits may be received into
evidence if neither party objects.' 4 The standard of proof is "clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence. 05 If the probate court finds the re-
spondent "as a result of mental illness, presents a likelihood of serious
Presumably, legislators thought the right to refuse medication would eliminate possible side
effects such as slurred speech or dazed expression, which may detract from the respondent's ap.
pearance in court. Twenty-four hours, however, is not long enough to eradicate the long-lasting
effects of many psychotropic drugs. See Jarvik, Drugs Used in the Treatment of Pschiatric Disor-
ders, in THE PHARMOCOLOGICAL BAsIs OF THERAPEUTICS 171-72 (1965).
The patient may also present a poorer image without medication, le., rapid speech, flight of
ideas, and manic look. In addition, the provision creates administrative uncertainties. The court
can schedule the probable cause hearing any time within 96 hours of the patient's admission. The
hospital may not know when to cease administration of drugs.
100. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.135.1 (1979). The judge may grant continuances upon a good
cause showing and release the patient pending the hearing. Id. In rural Missouri where judges
still ride circuit, the four-day time frame may be impossible to meet.
101. Id. § 202.133.2. Subsections (1) through (5) list the allegations petitioner must make:
that respondent, by reason of mental illness, presents a likelihood of serious physical harm; that
respondent needs detention and treatment; that a mental health facility has agreed to accept re-
spondent; and, that the specific behavior of respondent supports the petition. The attorney served
with the petition must also be provided with the names of petitioner's prospective witnesses. Id.
102. Id. § 202.135.2. The patient may be present unless his conduct "is so disruptive that the
proceedings cannot reasonably continue with him present," or "his physical condition is such that
his presence would entail too great a risk of serious physical harm." Id. § 202.135.2(7), (10).
Although the latter determination is made by the court, there is no requirement that the judge
personally view the patient. A respondent may waive his right to be present if his attorney has
explained to him the "nature, purpose, and import of the hearing." Id. § 202.135.2(9).
103. Id. § 202.135.2(8).
104. Id. § 202.135.3- .4.
105. Id. § 202.135.5.
[Clear and convincing proof is a standard frequently imposed in civil cases where the
wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, as where this high
standard is required to sustain claims which have serious social consequences or harsh or
far-reaching effects on individuals, to prove willful, wrongful, and unlawful acts, to jus-
tify an exceptional judicial remedy, or to circumvent established legal safeguards, or in
the case of claims evidenced merely by the oral testimony of interested witnesses as to
events long past.
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1023 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
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physical harm to himself or others," the court must order involuntary
treatment for fourteen days."° The court, in the best interests of the
patient, may order detention in "a less restrictive environment which is
reasonably available."'
'0 7
Upon expiration of the fourteen-day period, the court, in accordance
with the procedures used at a probable cause hearing, 08 may commit
the patient for an additional ninety-day period'0 9 and successive one-
year periods. "0
An involuntarily committed patient has three routes to discharge.
First, if the state fails to carry its burden of proof at any judicial hear-
ing, the court must order the patient's release."' Second, the patient
may appeal the court commitment or apply for a writ of habeas
corpus." 2 Finally, the new code imposes a duty upon the head of the
facility to review every six months the status of each involuntarily com-
mitted patient, and to discharge the patient when he no longer is men-
tally ill or presents a likelihood of serious physical harm."
t3
Comparisons of involuntary commitment procedures in the old code
with those in the revised code are difficult because the entire thrust of
the statute has changed. One major difference is the time frame within
which the commitment process operates. Previously, thirty days could
elapse before a court determined whether a patient's mental condition
106. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.135.5 (1979).
107. Id.
108. See notes 100-07 supra and accompanying text. At the hearing to determine these longer
periods, the patient may request ajury trial, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 202.137.1(2), .145.1(2) (1979), and
the appointment of a licensed physician to testify in his behalf. Id. §§ 202.140.2, .145.2.
109. Id. §§ 202.137, .140, .143.
110. Id. §202.145, .147, .149.
111. Id. 6§ 202.135.5, .143.3, .145.3.
112. Id. §§ 202.170.1,. 173. Habeas corpus is "the privilege of an imprisoned or detained per-
Non, of being bailed, tried, or discharged without arbitrary delay." H. BINNEY, THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1862). The patient has the burden
of proving the illegality of his confinement. See Thompson v. Sanders, 334 Mo. 1100, 1103-04, 70
S.W.2d 1051, 1053 (1934). Habeas corpus is also available in cases in which the petitioner was
properly committed in the first instance, but no longer meets the criteria for commitment. See De
Marcos v. Overholser, 137 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 785 (1943).
113. Mo. RE,. STAT. §§ 202.153.1, .183.1 (1979). The mental health coordinator and the com-
mitting court receive a copy of the semiannual evaluation. The court, upon its own motion or
motion of the patient, must order a hearing to determine the continued need for detention and
involuntary treatment. Thereafter, the court may discharge the patient, order a less restrictive
course of detention and treatment, or remand the patient to the mental hospital. Id. § 202.153.1-
2.
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warranted involuntary hospitalization. 114 Today, the time from initial
detention to judgment must not exceed four days.I" Prior law man-
dated that hospital staff examine every involuntary patient as soon as
practicable after admission;" 6 the new law, however, dictates which
staff members shall see the patient and sets stricter time guidelines."1
7
The new statute also replaces indeterminate commitments," 8 which re-
quired hospitals to reexamine as frequently as practicable the appropri-
ateness of a patient's hospitalization," 9 with determinate yearly
commitments under which hospitals must reevaluate every six months
the propriety of each patient's detention and treatment.
20
Another significant variation from the prior statute is the withdrawal
from physicians of the authority to act in emergency situations. For-
merly, certification by one licensed physician of an individual's mental
illness and consequent dangerousness plus application by anyone alleg-
ing the individual's dangerousness permitted confinement of the indi-
vidual for fifteen days if the head of the facility notified the probate
court of the patient's admission.' 2 ' Present law authorizes only the
mental health coordinator and peace officers to take a person into cus-
tody in an emergency situation.
122
The involuntary procedures present a number of potential problems.
First, the legislature considerably weakened the role of the coordinator
as originally proposed in the 1977 bill.123 The 1977 bill required that
the coordinator file all petitions for initial detention,124 but under the
adopted act any adult person may file for initial detention. 2 5 The sole
114. Id. § 202.805 (1969).
115. Id. § 202.133.1 (1979). See note 8 supra.
116. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.820 (1969).
117. Id. § 202.123.4-.5 (1979).
118. Id. § 202.790.5 (Supp. 1975). See note 11 supra.
119. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.827 (1969).
120. Id. § 202.153.1 (1979).
121. Id. §§ 202.800.1, .805.1- .2 (1969).
122. Id. § 202.123.3 (1979). A proposed amendment to the new act would restore the physi-
cian's authority to detain a person whom he has "reasonable cause to believe . . . is mentally
disordered and presents an imminent likelihood of serious physical harm to himself or others
unless he is accepted for detention." Mo. S.243, 80th General Assembly, 1st Sess. § 202,123.4
(1979).
123. Mo. S.275, 79th General Assembly, 1st Ses. (1977).
124. Id. § 202.129.6(1). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.150(l)(c) (Supp. 1977) (granting
the designated mental health professional exclusive authority to file all petitions for initial
detention).
125. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.123.1- .2 (1979).
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purpose of the coordinator in the mental health system is to investigate
and evaluate allegations that a person needs detention and treat-
ment. 126 The coordinator, through his advocacy and "gate-keeping"
functions, serves to eliminate unjustified detention of those not subject
to the act and to promote judicial economy by removing the need for
an ex parte hearing before taking a person into custody.'27 Missouri's
failure to retain the coordinator's exclusive power to file applications
renders nugatory the purpose of the position.
The legislature's treatment of the coordinator position also gives rise
to a potential conflict of interest. The 1977 bill stipulated that the
mental health coordinator could not be a staff member of a mental
health facility that accepts involuntary patients. 128 The absence of this
restriction in the enacted bill creates a danger that the mental health
coordinator's desire to help the alleged mentally disordered person at
his facility may interfere with his judgment about whether the individ-
ual meets the statutory criteria for confinement.
29
Another problem with the involuntary procedures stems from the
class of persons who may file an application for nonemergency deten-
tion. The new statute increases the possibilities for harrassment by en-
larging the group of people who may file an application to include any
adult person.' 30 The problem is compounded by the new statute's dele-
tion of the requirement that an application for commitment be accom-
panied by a certificate of a licensed physician, which states that on the
basis of his examination he believes the individual to be mentally ill.'
31
The present statute takes the position that a judge, in a hearing at
which the alleged mentally disordered person is not present, is better
able to determine the need for detention than a licensed physician who
126. Id. § 202.121.1.
127. Id. § 202.121.3.
128. Mo. S.275, 79th General Assembly, 1st Sess. § 202.125.2 (1977).
129. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.140.2 (1979) recognizes that this conflict of interest may arise and
allows appointment of an independent physician to testify on the patient's behalf. See also In re
Gannon, 123 N.J. Super. 104, 301 A.2d 493 (Somerset County Ct. 1973) (right to independent
psychiatrist); T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 105-21 (1966) (norm in medical diagnosis is to err
on the side of judging a well person to be sick rather than judging a sick person to be well).
130. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.1231 (1979). The prior Missouri statute permitted only a friend,
relative, spouse, county sheriff, guardian, health officer, or head of the institution where the indi-
vidual is located to file an application for involuntary commitment. Id. § 202.807.1 (Supp. 1975).
See also Peters, Teply, Wunsch & Zimmerman, Administrative Ciril Commitment, 10 CREIGHTON
L, REV. 243, 272 (1976).
131. Mo. RE'. STAT. § 202.807.1 (Supp. 1975).
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has examined the person.," A better solution would be to require
judge and physician to collaborate on the question. 133
The new statute also contains a serious ambiguity concerning the
right of physicians to treat patients detained for the initial ninety-six
hour period. 1 4 Certain provisions of the code refer to the ninety-six
hour period as a time for detention and evaluation; 3 5 other provisions
designate the period as a time for evaluation and treatment.3 6 In light
of the act's emphasis on individual liberties, one could argue that hos-
pital staff should impose no involuntary medical treatment upon a pa-
tient until a court orders his commitment. On the other hand, few
hospitals have the facilities to contain a hostile, aggressive patient for
four days without the use of medication. In addition, courts may view
the patient's right to refuse medication twenty-four hours prior to his
probable cause hearing3 7 as implying legislative approval of treatment
before then.
The new statute adopts "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" as
the standard of proof,3 8 and therefore comports with the Supreme
Court's ruling this term that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires states to use a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof in civil commitment proceedings.' 3 9 Given the difficulty of pre-
dicting dangerousness" and the poor reliability of psychiatric diagno-
sis,141 this standard is arguably appropriate. The individual's liberty
132. I1d. § 202.123.2 (1979).
133. In nonemergency detentions there are no time pressures to prevent effective collaboration
between a judge and a physician. While the law should not abdicate to medical judgment, it
should recognize the profession's expertise. See generally Poythress, Mental Health Expert Testi-
mony, 5 J. PsycH. & L. 201 (1977).
134. Cf. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5172 (Deering Supp. 1978) ("Each person admitted to a
facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation ... shall receive such treatment and care as his
condition requires for the full period that he is held."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.210
(Supp. 1977) ("Each person involuntarily admitted to an evaluation and treatment facility . .
shall receive such treatment and care as his condition requires for the period that he is detained,
except that, beginning twenty-four hours prior to a court proceeding, the individual may refuse all
but emergency life-saving treatment. ... )
135. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 202.123.3, .123.4(2), .125.1, .127.1- .2 (1979).
136. Id. §§ 202.123.2- .3, .127.4, .130.
137. Id. § 202.130(6).
138. Id. §§ 202.135.5, .143.2. See note 10 sunpra.
139. Addington v. Texas, 47 U.S.L.W. 4473 (1979). Although the Constitution requires only
clear and convincing evidence, states may dictate a more stringent standard of proof. Id at 4476-
77.
140. See authorities cited at note 44 supra.
141. A. Buss, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 39-42 (1966).
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interest, however, may so strongly outweigh the state's interest in pro-
tecting the patient and others that states should employ the stricter "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof.142 Perhaps the state
should require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of factual allegations
on which commitment is based, and clear and convincing evidence of
dangerousness and mental illness.
143
A final problem in the statute's procedures for involuntary detention
relates to the provision for less restrictive alternative courses of treat-
ment. At any hearing beyond the probable cause hearing, the court
may order a "less restrictive course of detention and involuntary treat-
ment," 1" if in the best interest of the respondent. Furthermore, the
head of the mental health facility must conclude every six months that
each patient is receiving treatment in the least restrictive environment
consistent with his needs, 45 and the director may release a patient to a
less restrictive environment when in the patient's best interests. 146 The
language of the statute, however, is permissive, not mandatory; thus the
statute imposes no duty upon a court or hospital director to order a less
restrictive course of treatment even when a patient's best interests war-
rant such treatment. The wide discretion of the court and hospital di-
rector in ordering less restrictive treatment may render meaningless the
promising language. 47 In addition, the director of the department of
mental health may override both the court's and the hospital director's
decisions, thus further emasculating the provision. 4  The statute's
failure to require alternatives to hospitalization supports such
conjecture. 1
49
142. See United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975); In re
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973): Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In
re Pickles' Petition, 170 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d
681 (Ky. 1964).
143. This standard is suggested by Peters, Teply, Wunsch & Zimmerman in Administrative
Ciil Commitment, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 243, 269 (1976).
144. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 202.143.3, .145.3, .153.2(2) (1979).
145. Id § 202.120(1).
146. Id. § 202.180.1.
147. The 1977 proposal required the probate court to find that a less restrictive alternative was
not appropriate before it could order detention. Mo. S.275, 79th General Assembly, Ist Sess.
§§ 202.150.3, .157.2- .159.3, .160.3 (1977).
148, Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.150 (1979). The director shall "notwithstanding any provision...
to the contrary. . . determine where detention and involuntary treatment shall take place." Id.
149. Id. § 202.205.
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IV. NONPROCEDURAL PATIENT RIGHTS
Perhaps the most pressing concerns of a patient are those that relate
to his treatment. Missouri's revised statute provides that all patients
shall be "entitled to humane care and treatment" and to "freedom from
verbal and physical abuse."' 50 Every patient must receive, subject to
the availability of equipment and personnel, "medical care and treat-
ment in accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical
practice."'' Patients treated by prayer may refuse medical treatment
on religious grounds.'5 2 Further, any patient may refuse electroshock
treatment. 
53
The code also provides rights designed to make daily life in the hos-
pital less oppressive for the patient and to allow him continuous contact
with the outside world. The mental health facility must provide pa-
tients with a brochure enumerating these rights, and, if necessary, hos-
pital staff must explain them.
154
Finally, the code safeguards the patient's right to confidentiality of
records. The fact of admission and all information and records com-
piled by the mental health coordinator or hospital may be released only
in a few limited situations 55 or upon the patient's authorization.11
6
The state may no longer deny the implementation of these non-
procedural rights on the basis of prohibitive cost. Because humane
150. Id.
151. Id. The qualification of this entitlement renders the promise an empty one.
152. Id. § 202.207.1.
153. Id. § 202.213. A court order is needed to administer electroshock without the patient's
consent, and then only after a full evidentiary hearing. The order is not necessary if, absent treat-
ment, the patient would die within 48 hours. Id.
154. Id. § 202.215.5.
The patient "bill of rights" includes the right: to wear one's own clothing and keep personal
possessions; to keep and spend a reasonable sum of one's own money; to communicate by sealed
mail; to receive visitors at reasonable times; to have reasonable access to a telephone to make and
receive confidential calls; to be served a nourishing well-balanced diet; to have an opportunity for
physical exercise and outdoor recreation; and to have reasonably prompt access to current news-
papers, magazines, and television programming. Any of these rights may be curtailed at the rec-
ommendation of the head of the facility in the interest of the patient's medical welfare. Id.
§ 202.215(1)-(8). The patient has an absolute right, however, to communicate by sealed mail with
the mental health department and committing court, as well as a right to receive private visits
from his attorney, physician, or clergyman at reasonable times. Id. § 202.215.3- .4.
155. Information and records may be disclosed to health care providers, insurance companies,
welfare officials, courts, law enforcement officers, the patient's and petitioner's attorneys, and the
mental health coordinator. Id. § 202.195.1(2)-(9).
156. Id. § 202.195.1.
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care and treatment for the mentally ill under the new code are not con-
tingent upon the availability of resources, 57 courts may order physical
improvements in state mental institutions and may release patients who
have not received humane care and treatment. 15S
The legislature, however, failed to imbue the term "treatment" with
much substance. The legislature defined the term as "any effort to ac-
complish a significant change in the mental or emotional conditions or
the behavior of the patient."' 5 9 Although the United States Supreme
Court has not yet recognized a constitutional "right to treatment,"
160
some lower courts have ordered hospitals to make a "bona fide effort"
to cure or improve an involuntary patient's mental condition as evi-
denced by "initial and periodic inquiries. . into the needs and condi-
tions of the patient with a view to providing suitable treatment," and by
provision of a program suited to the patient's particular needs. 16 1 Leg-
islatures in other states have responded to these cases with elaborate
enactments that describe what constitutes treatment.162  Missouri
157. Compare Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.840 (1969) with Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.205 (1979).
158. See 44 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 23 (1975).
159. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.010(27) (1979).
160. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
161. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451,456 (1966). See Welsch v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D.
Minn. 1974) (mentally retarded); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (mentally
ill. See general' Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Katz, The Right to
Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1969).
162. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.17, subd. 9 (West Supp. 1979):
Every person hospitalized or otherwise receiving services ... shall be entitled to re-
ceive proper care and treatment, best adapted, according to contempory professional
standards, to rendering further custody, institutionalization, or other services unneces-
sary'. To this end the head of the hospital shall devise or cause to be devised for each
person so hospitalized a written program plan which shall describe in behavioral terms
the case problems, and the precise goals, including the expected period of time for hospi-
talization, and the specific measures to be employed in the solution or easement of said
problems. Each plan shall be reviewed at not less than quarterly intervals to determine
progress toward the goals, and to modify the program plan as necessary. The program
plan shall be devised and reviewed in each instance with the appropriate county welfare
department, and with the patient. The hospital record shall attest to the program plan
review. If the county welfare department or the patient does not so participate in the
planning and review, the hospital record shall include reasons for non-participation and
the plans for future involvement.
The department of public welfare shall monitor the aforementioned program plan and
review process to insure compliance with the provisions of this subdivision.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7104 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979):
Adequate treatment means a course of treatment designed and administered to allevi-
ate a person's pain and distress and to maximize the probability of his recovery from
mental illness. It shall be provided to all persons in treatment who are subject to this act.
It may include inpatient treatment, partial hospitalization, or outpatient treatment. Ade-
quate inpatient treatment shall include such accommodations, diet, heat, light, sanitary
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should have followed that lead. While such statutes limit the preroga-
tive of hospitals and physicians to provide what each deems to be ap-
propriate treatment, these enactments guard against the provision of
mere custodial care.
The new statute also allows the courts to order involuntary treatment
of the mentally ill; 163 previously, the court could order only hospitaliza-
tion.t64 This change in the law is unfortunate because the act, while
authorizing treatment, fails to specify what treatment is permissible.
The statute does prohibit electroshock treatment without the informed
and voluntary written consent of the patient, except under extreme cir-
cumstances. 165 Psychosurgery, however, apparently may be performed
under the present statute without the patient's consent. 1
66
Finally, patients lost their right under the new act to criminally pros-
ecute persons who caused their unwarranted hospitalization or other-
wise violated their rights. t67 The legislature eliminated both civil and
criminal liability of public hospital staff and other public officials "per-
forming functions necessary for administration of chapter 202. . . pro-
vided that such duties were performed in good faith and without gross
negligence."'' 68  While qualified immunity may promote fearless en-
forcement of the act's provisions, it will leave without an adequate
remedy those patients who feel they have been "railroaded."'
' 69
facilities, clothing, recreation, education and medical care as are necessary to maintain
decent, safe and healthful living conditions.
Treatment shall include diagnosis, evaluation, therapy, or rehabilitation needed to al-
leviate pain and distress and to facilitate the recovery of a person from mental illness and
shall also include care and other services that supplement treatment and aid or promote
such recovery.
163. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 202.123.2- .3, .135.5, .143.3, .145.3 (1979).
164. Id. § 202.807.5 (Supp. 1975). At least one probate judge under prior law refused to re-
quire a patient to submit to a program of involuntary medical treatment. Sullivan, Judiciaip-
Ordered Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally I11, 31 J. Mo. B. 254 (1975). The statutory lan-
guage now permits forced medical treatment.
165. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.213 (1979). See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
166. The earlier Senate bill prohibited psychosurgery without the written consent of the pa-
tient. Mo. S.275, 79th General Assembly, 1st Sess. § 202.183 (1977).
167. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.870 (Supp. 1975).
168. Id. § 202.200 (1979). Persons making and filing applications for detention are also pro-
tec- -' f, om ti, imposition of liability if they acted in good faith.
A proposed ,-, iment to the new act would bestow the same immunity on the staff of private
hospitals. Mo. S.243, F0th (,,,,.ral Assembly, 1st Sess. § 202.200 (1979).
169. See T. SzAsz, LAw, L.BEi FV, AND PSYCHIATRY 66-70, 217-18 (1963).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Missouri legislature should be commended for its revision of the
laws regarding civil commitment of the mentally ill. The standards for
commitment set forth in the new act 170 more precisely define those per-
sons subject to civil commitment and thus should enable the statute to
better withstand constitutional challenges of vagueness or overbreadth
to which the prior statute was susceptible. In addition, the revised code
offers significantly greater procedural protections for the admission and
discharge of both voluntary' 7 ' and involuntary 7 2 patients. Finally, the
new statute guarantees to patients in mental health facilities certain
nonprocedural rights designed to make daily life in hospitals less
oppressive.
173
Despite these improvements, however, the new code fails to ade-
quately secure for mental patients in Missouri certain rights that other
jurisdictions have recognized, such as the right of a minor to contest his
parent's application for his admission,' 4 the right to adequate treat-
ment, ' and the right to treatment in the least restrictive envi-
ronment.176 The legislature should act to alleviate these deficiencies
before they give rise to judicial declarations of the statute's uncon-
stitutionality.
Valerie Hughes Staulcup
170. See notes 14-48 supra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 49-80 supra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 81-149 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 150-69 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 159-66 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 144-49 supra and accompanying text.
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